| EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: |
| Haley Alexander |
| -------------------- |
| EXECUTIVE EDITOR: |
| Frank Zebari |
| -------------------- |
| MANAGING EDITOR: |
| Stephen Grant |
| -------------------- |
| ARTICLES EDITORS: |
| Laurel Yecny |
| Lucas Michels |
| Patrick Rooks |
| -------------------- |
| SYMPOSIUM EDITORS: |
| Paul Stewart |
| Jessica Campbell |
| -------------------- |
| MARKETING EDITOR: |
| Jaclyn Gaddy |
| -------------------- |
| TECHNICAL EDITOR: |
| E. Tyler Howell |
| -------------------- |
| PUBLIC SERVICE EDITOR: |
| Paul Chaon |
Current Volume
A NECESSARY GLOBAL DISCUSSION FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW ON MUSIC SAMPLING
| Volume 15 - Issue 1 (2011-2012) |
The moment is seared into my memory. It was 1990 and I was 13. It started as a normal Saturday morning, which at that time consisted of watching one of my favorite television shows, “Saved by the Bell.” During a break from the show, a music video came on. At the time, I was a fan of M.C. Hammer, the Beastie Boys, and Run D.M.C., but I had never heard or seen anything quite like what I saw on television that morning, the music video for “Ice Ice Baby” by Vanilla Ice. Being only 13 years old, my musical taste was limited and my music history was lacking, but I knew one thing: I loved that bass-line. Shortly thereafter, “Ice Ice Baby” became a smash hit, at least partially due to the catchy bass line. Vanilla Ice and his disc jockey (D.J.) eventually admitted they sampled “Ice Ice Baby[‘s]” bass line from Queen and David Bowie’s song “Under Pressure.”While this was my first knowing exposure to sampled music, musicians have built upon prior works of other musicians since at least the eighteenth century.Classical composers such as George Frideric Handel and Johann Sebastian Bach borrowed, re-arranged, and re-organized previously known works to create new musical compositions.In fact, Handel’s utilization of other’s musical compositions stirred debate in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries about whether such practice was proper and ethical. Essentially, those debates mirror the debates happening today surrounding a similar practice – musicians of all genres sampling other musicians’ sound recordings in their new songs. Sampling occurs when one musician takes parts of another musician’s sound recording and transposes it into his or her new sound recording. Although the debate regarding Handel’s practices was over copying “musical compositions” as opposed to “sound recordings,” the question is the same – how should the law strike an appropriate balance between protecting musicians’ copyrights while also promoting the creation of new and innovative music?
In the United States (U.S.), the Copyright Act provides protection for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .” The U.S. Copyright Act expressly lists “musical works” and “sound recordings” as “works of authorship” appropriate for copyright protection. Initially, it is important to understand that within any song there are two distinct copyrights: the “musical works” right and the “sound recording” right. While the U.S. Copyright Act does not define “musical works” because the definition was “fairly settled” at the time of the law’s enactment, “musical works” means the musical composition, or the notes and lyrics of the song apart from any particular recording of the song. The U.S. Copyright Act defines “sound recordings” as “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . .” and grants the copyright holder the exclusive right to “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords . . .” as well as “prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work[‘s]” “musical work” and/or “sound recording.” In the sampling context, to determine whether one musician has infringed upon another musician’s copyright in his or her “musical work” and/or “sound recording,” courts traditionally determine whether: (1) the plaintiff has a valid copyright in the work; (2) actual copying occurs; and (3) the two works are “substantially similar” to each other. The “substantial similarity” aspect of the infringement test will be detailed in Part II(B)(1) of this paper. As will be seen below, the “substantial similarity” test for infringement, even though it is the pre-eminent test to determine copyright infringement, has two problems when it comes to musical composition and sound recording sampling. First, the standard is too vague for artists to confidently know whether their new songs, utilizing sampled sound recordings (which also inherently utilize the musical composition), will infringe the underlying copyrights. Second, in many instances the amount of copyrighted work taken from the underlying song is insignificant to the new song as a whole. Due to these issues, it can be argued that current copyright law does not meet the needs of artists attempting to utilize sampled music, nor does it meet the needs of copyright holders who desire to control the use of their works. Unfortunately, the resulting lack of clarity in the law negatively impacts society as a whole because, as many artists attest, innovative and transformative sampling is not happening in music today due to copyright infringement fears.
In attempting to provide a bright line rule regarding sound recordings, sampling specifically, as well as to provide stronger protection for copyright holders, the Sixth Circuit for the U.S. Court of Appeals rejected the “substantial similarity” test to determine actionable infringement of sound recordings. Instead, the Sixth Circuit instituted a per se standard for sound recording infringement. In Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, the Sixth Circuit held that any sampling of another’s copyrighted sound recording, no matter how de minimis, automatically constituted copyright infringement. While a split among the circuits remains intact, scholars across the board have argued that the Bridgeport Music decision was an incorrect interpretation of Section 114 of the U.S. Copyright Act and should not be followed. Additionally, one subsequent court, in the Eleventh Circuit, has expressly rejected the Bridgeport Music analysis.
In cases where a plaintiff copyright owner proves a defendant infringed his or her copyright in a sound recording or musical composition, a defendant typically has the ability to assert two defenses: “fair use” and “de minimis” use. In codifying the fair use defense, Congress recognized that some purposes, such as criticism, comment, news reporting, and teaching are so important and so aligned with the purpose of the Constitution’s copyright clause that they deserve legal protection.
Commentators and scholars who understand the problems surrounding sampling, the infringement test, and the applicable defenses to a copyright infringement suit, have offered many suggestions on how to improve U.S. copyright laws in order to achieve a more productive and fair legal system. Many of the suggestions fall into two groups. First, some scholars and commentators suggest instituting a compulsory licensing scheme whereby artists are legally mandated to license their sound recordings for sampling purposes. In return for artists granting a license of their sound recordings to other artists, licensor artists would then receive structured compensation from licensee artists. Second, other scholars and commentators highlight the option of strengthening “fair use” defenses as a way to facilitate increased sampling.
This article will review the suggested improvements to the U.S. Copyright Act, particularly focusing on how some of the commentators’ ideas likely conflict with international moral rights concepts and laws, and how such international moral rights laws will directly affect any attempt to implement more productive sampling laws in the U.S. Specifically, international treaties, like the Berne Convention, give authors of “musical works” (musical compositions) the right to “object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.” Another global treaty, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), provides moral rights protection to musicians in their sound recordings. If the U.S. attempts to implement a compulsory licensing scheme or strengthen its fair use laws, without the direct involvement of the international community, how will those legal changes interact with international treaties and norms? Moreover, due to the ease of digital media file distribution over the internet, it is highly impractical to have one song be legal in the U.S., under a fair use defense or a compulsory license, and illegal in the rest of the world.
Accordingly, any congressional or judicial action attempting to facilitate sampling through the weakening of a copyright author’s rights will face practical as well as legal challenges on a global scale. The dilemma this paper addresses, in the context of sampling copyrighted sound recordings (again, which incorporates the underlying musical composition), is how can our global society balance and reconcile two different legal interests or norms and produce an effective and meaningful sound recording sampling law? Specifically, this paper recognizes that solutions to sampling issues must reflect the U.S.’ constitutionally mandated desire to “promot[e] the Progress of Science,” while at the same time accommodating the moral rights desires of countries that follow the “personhood” theory of authorship. Finding a solution that meets both seemingly opposite interests will be difficult; however, the only way to accomplish this is to place a paramount focus, within the contexts of the Berne Convention and the WPPT, on balancing two different legal interests and norms in a global setting with the aim of creating one uniform worldwide law on sampling.
Part II of this paper introduces sampling, reviews the applicable U.S. laws related to sampling, and discusses the two current copyright infringement standards U.S. courts apply to actions involving sampled sound recordings. Additionally, Part II reviews the two defenses available to a copyright defendant: fair use and de minimis use defenses. Part III reviews scholars’ and commentators’ ideas to encourage the creation of more sample-based music, including compulsory licensing schemes and strengthening the fair use defense. Part IV of this paper reviews the two international treaties that are implicated in sampling cases: the Berne Convention and the WPPT. Additionally, Part IV reviews France’s strong moral rights protections and discusses how commentators’ and scholars’ recommendations to facilitate an increase in sample-based music likely conflicts with moral rights laws and norms of several countries, such as France. Lastly, Part V highlights the fact that, due to the ease of transmitting music worldwide via the internet, any legal improvement intending to encourage sample-based music should be created at a global level under the Berne Convention and the WPPT. Moreover, Part V demonstrates that any amendments to the Berne Convention and the WPPT must be specific, and create a ceiling of protection to facilitate a productive law.
|
| Volume 15 - Issue 1 (2011-2012) |
In a small Iranian village, a woman awakens in a barely conscious state, bloody and buried in a ditch. Escape, a futile impossibility. Restrained and aching, she struggles to open one badly bruised eye and sees her husband, the man who conspired with village leaders to wrongly accuse her of adultery. As she closes her eye, a single tear runs down her unrecognizable face. The woman’s husband yells with rage, “The bitch is still alive!” as her own father and two young sons proceed to cast stones at her tired, lifeless body.
This commentary attempts to reveal the internal and external inconsistencies that have historically influenced the formal development of Iranian women’s rights. One of the main focuses of the paper will be evaluating the rule of the Islamic Jurist (velayat-e faqih), which governs the current body of Iran’s domestic legal jurisprudence. An additional focus will be the historical political context in which gender-related laws were conceived under the Shah’s modernist reforms during the Revolution and rise of political Islam. Further, this commentary will analyze the period following Khomeini’s tenure as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, tracking the implementation of contradictory policies resulting from the government’s erratic and often confusing approach to the “woman question.”
Part II provides a descriptive overview of the historical, political, and feminist developments in pre-and post-revolutionary Iranian society. Through a changing political landscape, feminism and discussions of gender politics have taken on various meanings in Iran. The interplay between an emerging Islamic feminist discourse and the religious Shari’a laws, that dictate women’s legal rights and obligations in Iran, demonstrates the manner in which the clerical leadership has treated the democratic elements of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution as subservient to its Theocratic mandates.
Part II of this commentary further explores the apparent paradox between Iranian women’s growing agency and presence as political actors on the one hand, and lack of formally recognized legal rights on the other. An evaluation of President Khatami’s reformist vision and subsequent failure to implement any substantial human rights improvements illustrates some of the more pragmatic challenges Iranian women continue to face in their struggle for equality. As a result of the government’s male-dominated hierarchical structure, secular and religious women alike have experienced a degree of marginalization that their political agency alone cannot solve. Despite a once flourishing feminist dialogue, the Iranian government’s response has been alarmingly stagnant alongside the increasing marginalization of Iranian women. Accordingly, women’s rights proponents in Iran have focused on a working re-interpretation of the Islamic texts themselves, arguing that what clerical leaders assert to be the divine and infallible law — the “Shari’alaw” — is a product of human, and thus fallible, jurisprudential extrapolation.
In part III, this commentary addresses the reasons underlying Islamic feminists’ failure to persuade the clerical leadership to adopt the seemingly reasonable and righteous ideas these feminists have generated. Iranian Shari’a law appears to remain closed to any liberalized interpretations of Islam proposed by women’s rights activists working within a religious framework. Despite such resistance, Islamic feminists have made incredible strides in creating a space for dialogue regarding women’s issues and reinforcing the commonality of experience between secular and religious women in Iran. However, the efficacy of Islamic feminist’s progressive, jurisprudential assertions alone have proven unsuccessful in reconciling many Muslim women’s faith with the fixed, oppressive patriarchal expressions in Iranian Shari’a laws.
In maintaining systematic gender biases, the post-revolutionary regime has both implicitly and explicitly afforded the Islamic Republic’s state interests priority over “ Islam” itself—the divine authority from which the male-dominated clerical leadership has derived and sustained a form of unchecked legitimacy. This commentary suggests that through a static interpretation of Shari’a, Iranian clerical leaders have confined themselves to a system of governance largely unresponsive to social change. Consequently, the current legal philosophy remains untenable in consideration of women’s growing political agency and the increasingly educated class of female citizens who make up modern Iranian society.
This commentary centrally argues that the old “Islamic conformity” rationale for non-compliance with international human rights standards is the exact same as the modern Iranian “national security” agenda. In challenging the leadership’s fundamentalist interpretations of Islam that devalue women, Iranian feminists should draw upon their male counterparts’ frustrations with the government’s current “national security” agenda to expose parallel hard-line religious justifications proffered in support of legalized gender inequalities. Specifically, the prevailing interpretations of “Islam” and corresponding Shari’a laws in Iran reveal a pattern of jurisprudential constructions by male clerics that serve to perpetuate relationships of dominance and authority to preserve the status quo and shun alternative, dissident, and counter-cultural interpretations. The government’s interpretation of Islamic mandates within the realm of “national security” often reflect and reinforce the same pre-textual rationales applied to the politics of gender under the current regime. Its manipulation and broad application of punishment for “enmity against God” implies that the government’s false notions of “culture” are not perceived as authentic to the majority of Iranians.
Part IV suggests that within the current push for regime change in Iran, the materialization of positive democratic guarantees depends on societal and legal recognition of gender equality. In light of educational opportunities available to Iranian Women, the ideologies held by Iranian youth, and the recent pro-democratic movements worldwide, the most favorable conditions for change exist. Religious and secular men and women alike are censored or prohibited from taking an active role in the future of their country. The increased visibility of Iranian women’s issues is critical in mobilizing a shift in the current pattern of domination. This commentary asserts that the people’s freedom of the press, conscience, and association rights represent the most essential components in realizing formal gender equality in Iran. Through a reinvigoration of these key democratic principles, Iranian women will find a mechanism for expressing their progressive interpretations of Shari’a and achieving formal changes in their legal status.
Part V offers concluding remarks and sets forth a suggested course of action with regard to the international community’s responsibilities in supporting democratic reform of women’s rights in Iran.
STATUS AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE LIANCOURT ROCKS: THE DISPUTE BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA
| Volume 15 - Issue 1 (2011-2012) |
In the middle of the Sea of Japan, there are two tiny rocky islands surrounded by valuable fishing waters that have been a source of an ongoing and historic dispute between Japan and Korea. The islands are known as “Takeshima” in Japan and “Tokdo” in Korea. These islands are more commonly referred to as Liancourt Rocks. The dispute over the Liancourt Rocks has a long history, but recent events have intensified the competing claims. After a period of relative calm, Japan’s Shimane Prefectural Assembly designated February 22, 2005, as “Takeshima Day” to reiterate Japan’s territorial claim. Japan’s actions led to protestors in South Korea cutting off their fingers, stabbing themselves, and burning Japanese flags.
In order to comprehend the magnitude of the dispute over the Liancourt Rocks, a brief history is necessary. Until the early twentieth century, the relationship between Japan and Korea was stable. From 1910 to 1945, Japan, during a period of imperialism, colonized Korea. During those thirty-five years of colonization, Japan forced Koreans to speak Japanese, adopt Japanese names and religion, and sacrifice educational opportunities. The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty recognized Korea’s independence at the end of World War II. On Jan. 18, 1952, South Korea’s first president, Syngman Rhee, declared sovereignty around South Korea and drew a line (“Peace Line” or “Syngman Rhee Line”) in the Sea of Japan that included the area over the Liancourt Rocks. As an attempt to exclude the Japanese from the Sea of Japan, the Rhee Line explicitly acknowledged Korea’s claim. Since 1952, Korea has taken affirmative steps to develop the Liancourt Rocks. Korea has built a wharf, a police garrison, and most recently, a desalinization plant was donated by a Korean company. Despite the Liancourt disagreement, the two countries signed the Treaty on Basic Relations between Korea and Japan on June 22, 1965, normalizing their diplomatic relationship. In 1996 the dispute resurfaced when the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) was ratified, and Japan’s declaration of an exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) around the Liancourt Rocks was seen as an attempt to seize Korean sovereignty.
This article focuses on (1) the applicability of UNCLOS and an EEZ to the Liancourt Rocks and (2) the possible resolutions to the competing claims of sovereignty over the islands. Despite Korea’s continued occupation, it is unlikely that Liancourt Rocks are entitled to have an EEZ. On the issue of sovereignty, Korea has the strongest claim. Japan has offered to take the issue before an international adjudicatory body and it seems to be in Korea’s best interest to do so.
RAPE IN CONFLICT: BATTLING THE IMPUNITY THAT STIFLES ITS RECOGNITION AS A JUS COGENS HUMAN RIGHT
| Volume 15 - Issue 1 (2011-2012) |
Jus cogens is defined as “peremptory norms of general international law from which no derogation is permissible.” One human rights issue which unequivocally deserves jus cogens status but has yet to be elevated to this level of importance is rape in conflict areas.
The first section of this paper will provide an overview of the history of rape in conflict areas, the reasons for its prevalence, and the effects it has on women and communities. Part III will discuss the legal tools currently available in the international legal field to combat rape in conflict areas. This section will also discuss the lack of women’s involvement in crafting international jurisprudence and the resulting gendered approach that this has caused. Part IV will establish genocide as a jus cogens human right issue. This section will also discuss that rape has been prosecuted as a form of genocide, a crime against humanity, and a form of torture. Though this is an important recognition of this crime, it is a disservice to the victims to prosecute it only as it furthers another, greater crime. This paper will also argue in Part V that protection from rape in conflict should be considered a jus cogens human right, separate from the crime of genocide but regarded with the same importance. Finally, this section will make recommendations on national and international strategies that will combat impunity and allow protection from rape in conflict to be recognized as a jus cogens human right.