Cite as:  Richard B. Parker, A Suggested Amendment to the Constitution of Japan to Strengthen the Office of Prime Minister, 2 Gonz. J. Int’l L. (1998-99), available at http://www.gonzagajil.org/.

A Suggested Amendment to the Constitution of Japan to Strengthen the Office of Prime Minister

By Richard Barron Parker, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., J.D.

Professor of Law, Hiroshima Shudo University, Hiroshima, Japan. Haverford College (B.A., Philosophy,1962); Brown University (M.A., Philosophy, 1963); University of Chicago (Ph.D., Philosophy, 1968); Harvard Law School (J.D., 1971). Fulbright Lecturer in Law, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan (1983-84). Visiting Professor of Law, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan (1985-87). Appointed to current position in 1990.
The Constitution of Japan   (English version).  Japan Index   

The government of Japan lacks the ability to make quick and firm policy decisions. Concerned Japanese wish for a strong and effective leader, but the Japanese tradition of decision making by consensus ensures that the same parliamentary system that works well in Britain fails to work in Japan. Since the Japanese are unlikely to change their traditions of decision making by consensus, the solution may be to adjust the parliamentary system to allow the people to directly elect the Prime Minister of Japan, thus making the holder of that office the most powerful politician in Japan. In the British system, it is the office of Prime Minister that is powerful, not the individual who occupies that office. The British Prime Minister has the authority to make key decisions because of the power and authority of the office. When Margaret Thatcher or John Major lost the office of Prime Minister, they automatically lost their ability to influence key decisions.

In the Japanese system, it is individuals who are powerful rather than the office of Prime Minister. It is not uncommon for a man to be more powerful after he ceases to be Prime Minister than he was while he was Prime Minister. "Shadow shoguns" in Japan dilute the authority and capability of the actual Prime Minister to make the quick and effective decisions necessary for governing any large modern democracy. Power is so diffused among powerful politicians and bureaucrats that difficult decisions cannot be made. When powerful men disagree, there is no commonly accepted procedure for forcing a decision to be made. As a result, no one person has the authority to speak and act for Japan.

The purpose of the proposed amendment is to make the holder of the office of Prime Minister the most powerful politician in Japan. A directly elected Prime Minister could speak for Japan in a way that no one now can. Such a directly elected Prime Minister would enable the government to act rapidly and decisively by concentrating the responsibility for decision making in a single person. The proposed amendment is as follows:

"The Prime Minister shall be directly elected by the people in a separate and simultaneous election whenever there is a general election of the House of Representatives. Each electoral district used in the election of members of House of Representatives (currently 300) shall have one district vote which shall be cast for the candidate for Prime Minister receiving the largest number of votes by citizens in that district. The emperor shall appoint as Prime Minister the candidate receiving the largest number of district votes. In case of a tie vote, the Prime Minister shall be selected by the newly elected Diet in accord with Article 67."

"A person elected Prime Minister shall, by virtue of that election, be a member of the House of Representatives. A person may, but need not, run simultaneously for Prime Minister and for a seat representing a district in the House of Representatives." "Whenever there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, whether by individual resignation or death, or whenever the House passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Prime Minister shall resign, the House of Representatives shall be dissolved, and a new House shall be elected in accord with Article 54 and, simultaneously, a new Prime Minister shall be elected in accord with this Article of Amendment. A Prime Minister may run to succeed himself or herself as Prime Minister. No person shall serve more than a total of nine years as Prime Minister in his or her lifetime."

The purpose of the amendment is to strengthen the office of Prime Minister within a parliamentary system, not to set up an independent executive branch as in the United States. The executive power would remain with the Cabinet as provided in Article 65 of the current Constitution. Under the proposed amendment, the Prime Minister would be elected using the same districts as are used for the House of Representatives. A Prime Minister would thus usually belong to the party or coalition of parties with the largest representation in the House. The amendment would encourage parties to organize coalitions behind a single candidate for Prime Minister. In the unusual case when the newly elected Prime Minister did not enjoy the support of a majority of the newly elected House, either the House or the Prime Minister could force a new election immediately--the House could vote no-confidence, or the Prime Minister could resign. The proposed amendment would prevent a change in Prime Ministers without a general election of the House of Representatives. The recent resignation of Ryutaro Hoshimoto would by itself have forced a new election of the entire House and a direct election of the new Prime Minister. For example, had an amendment such as this one been in place at the time of Prime Minister Hoshimoto's resignation it would have prevented a situation such as occurred from 1993 to 1996 when Japan had three changes of Prime Minister (Hosokawa to Tsutomo Hata: Hata to Tomiichi Murayama: Murayama to Hashimoto) without an intervening election.

In short, the Prime Minister would be chosen by the people and could not be removed against his will so long as he could muster a majority of votes in the House. If he did resign voluntarily or was removed by a vote of no confidence, both he and all of the House would have to go back to the voters for a fresh mandate in a new election. As a result, the new amendment would strengthen the political independence and authority of the Prime Minister, yet keep him or her firmly under democratic control.